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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past fifteen years, Chile has undergone major politico-economic transfor-
mations which have had significant repurcussions on all structures of the society. In 
1970, Salvador Allende, the nominee of the Unidad Popular Party, was elected president. 
His economic objective was to promote income redistribution and social benefits to favor 
the more disadvantaged classes in society through a central-planned market economy. 
Allende's political goals were to nationalize all Chilean industries and, as an indication 
of his promise of populism and democracy, he allowed the opposition to occupy various 
positions in the government. 
After a military coup in 1973 which overthrew Allende's government, Chile's eco-
nomic and political objectives turned sharply. Whereas Salvador Allende had aimed for 
restriction of foreign financial influence in Chile, General Augusta Pinochet, the new 
Chilean president, pursued an economic policy which would facilitate and encourage 
the flow of foreign capital into the country. The key institution which facilitated the 
implementation of the new economic policy was the International Monetary Fund. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has had a direct and salient impact on the 
Chilean pursuit of free-market economy structures. The IMF provides credit and loans 
for member states in order to help facilitate their balance of payment difficulties and to 
restructure their debt payments. In addition, the IMF's endorsement of a particular 
country's economic policies has a powerful impact on other Washington-based lending 
institutions' and commercial banks' decisions to invest or lend money to the specific 
country in question. 
The objective of this article will be to assess the accomplishments of Allende's and 
Pinochet's divergent economic policies in accordance with the promotion and mainte-
nance of human rights. The United Nations, as well as the United States, has established 
legal frameworks for the protection and promotion of human rights which are pertinent 
to the Chilean case. The United Nations has succinctly defined and addressed the rights 
of man through a myriad of covenants, treaties and resolutions. By signing and ratifying 
these documents, the majority of states have conceded to a set of obligations which 
ensure respect for and realization of human rights. 
The United States has adopted legislation in the past decade that limits the extention 
of funds to governments which are gross violators of human rights. In addition to being 
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a dominant actor in international financial markets, the United States has provided 
significant financial contributions to most multilateral banks and development institu-
tions. Thus, where the voting structure functions on a weighted voting system, as it does 
in the IMF and the World Bank, the United States has a major voting share. The United 
States' twenty percent voting share in the IMF endows it with a powerful voice in financial 
decision-making processes. l In the final analysis, this article will discuss the necessity for 
the United States to coordinate its international economic objectives of free trade as 
promulgated through the IMF to its political objectives of promoting human rights and 
democracy as advocated by the United States Congress in order to establish an effective 
and consistent foreign policy. 
II. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
Among the most fundamental of human rights are the rights to mini-
mum acceptable levels of nutrition, health and education. Hundreds of 
millions of people in developing countries, through no fault of their own, 
are denied these rights today .... " 
It is in these countries that adjustment is particularly costly in human 
terms .... It is essential not to relax the efforts to combat inflation, but 
rather to press on with determination .... On the whole, this scenario -
while far from ideal - would have the great merit of bringing about needed 
adjustments throughout the world economy .... ' 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are sister institutions which 
were established in 1945 in order to restructure the war-demolished capitalist economies 
of Western Europe. The role of the IMF is to specifically deal with fiscal matters such 
as facilitating trade by creating a stable currency to be used by all nations, setting forth 
monetary guidelines for all member states to abide by, and helping to alleviate balance 
of payments problems.4 According to its Articles of Agreement, the IMF's precise pur-
poses are to increase international trade, to promote exchange rate stability and monetary 
cooperation, and to bring about high levels of employment, resource productivity and 
real income for member nations.5 The World Bank, on the other hand, undertook the 
reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II. With the addition of Third World 
countries as member states, the World Bank now provides technical and economic 
assistance for development in those countries.6 
Membership in the IMF is open to all countries which subscribe to the principles 
set forth by the original members in the Articles of Agreement. 7 Each member is assigned 
1 LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, THE POVERTY BROKERS, THE IMF AND LATIN AMERICA 27 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as L.A. BUREAU]. 
2 McNamara on the Largest Issue: World Economy, New York Times, April 2, 1978, at 3, col. 2. 
'Rothschild, The U.S. Pushes World Bank and IMF to be Supporters for Global Corporations, MUL-
TINATIONAL MONITOR, Nov. 1981, at 16. 
4 L.A. BUREAU, supra note I, at 16-18. 
5 Silard, The Role of the International Monetary Fund, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 89, 89-110 (1982). 
6 L.A. BUREAU, supra note I, at 16-18. 
7 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (as amended in 1978) art. 
II. This article states that: 
the original members of the IMF shall be those of the countries represented at the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference whose governments accept mem-
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a quota based on its paying subscription, which determines its voting power.s As opposed 
to other international organizations such as the United Nations, the IMF and the World 
Bank have both adopted a weighted voting system. Any program needs an eighty-five 
percent majority vote in order to pass. The United States, with 19.64% ofthe total votes, 
has an effective veto.9 Not only does the United States representative have a tremendous 
impact on the decisions of the IMF, but the United States Secretary of Treasury has 
complete authority in directing the position of the executive director. lo Moreover, with 
the United States and Western Europe collectively holding forty-eight percent of the 
total votes, the developing countries, which are most critically in need of the IMF's 
financing and credit, have an unequal leverage in the decision-making process with their 
thirty-five percent voting share.1I 
Under the Articles of Agreement, a member is entitled to withdraw funds if he can 
fulfill the following criteria.12 First, the member must indicate a need for the resources. 
Second, it must be shown that the resources will be used according to IMF Articles. 
Third, the country should not have been declared ineligible for receiving funds from 
the IMF. Finally, the member must not need any waiver due to its overutilization of 
funds. IS When a member withdraws or takes loans from the IMF, it is using its own 
bership before December 31, 1945 .... Membership shall be open to other countries 
at such times and in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Board 
of Governors. These terms, including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on 
principles consistent with those applied to other countries that are already members. 
8 [d. at art. III, sec. 1. This section states that: 
Each member shall be assigned a quota expressed in special drawing rights. The 
quotas of the members represented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference which accept membership before December 31, 1945 shall be those set 
forth in Schedule A. The quotas of other members shall be determined by the Board 
of Governors. The subscription of each member shall be equal to its quota and shall 
be paid in full to the Fund at the appropriate depository. 
See Gold, Weighted Voting Power: Some Limits and Some Problems, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 687-89 (1974). 
9 L.A. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
10 Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal emphasized his influential role in directing U.S. 
policies in the multilateral development banks to the U.S. Congress: "I would not and I would like 
the record to show that, exaggerate the degree of authority I have in this matter. I have complete 
authority ... to direct how our executive directors vote. I can only be overruled by the President 
himself." Foreign Assistance and Related Agmcies Appropriations for 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
pt. 1,429 (1978). 
11 L.A. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
12 Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited By Articles of Agreement When the Fund Considers 
Requests for Use of Resources, IMF SURVEY, May 23, 1983, at 146-48. 
15 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (as amended in 1978) art. V. sec. 
3 provides: 
... (b) A member shall be entitled to purchase the currencies of another member 
from the Fund in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own currency subject to 
the following conditions: (i) The member desiring to purchase the currency represents 
that it is presently needed for making in that currency payments which are consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement; (ii) The Fund has not given notice under Article 
VII, Section 3, that its holdings of the currency desired have become scarce; (iii) The 
proposed purchase would be a reserve tranche purchase, or would not cause the 
Fund's holding of the purchasing member's currency to exceed two hundred percent 
of its quota; (iv) The Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of this Article, 
Article VI, Section I, or Article XXVI, Section 2(a), that the member desiring to 
purchase is ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund .... 
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currency to buy another currency or Special Drawing Rights (SDR).J4 The member state 
has the option of withdrawing funds from a number of different IMF facilities. 
1) Reserve Tranche - A country may withdraw up to twenty-five percent of its quota 
without any conditions or repurchase requirements. IS This tranche is subject only to 
balance of payments needs. 16 
2) Credit Tranches - It is within this facility of the IMF that conditionality and 
standby arrangements are involved. There are four creditlloan levels or tranches within 
this facility, each entitling the member state to withdraw an equivalent to twenty-five 
percent of its quota. 17 Once the country has submitted a request for purchase from the 
credit tranches, it is then obligated to abide by the IMF recommendations on its fiscal 
policy, payment plan, exchange rates, and adjustment program. IS Heavier conditionality 
is imposed once members draw from upper credit tranches, since the IMF has to assure 
that the country will repay the IMF within a reasonable time. The IMF makes an 
arrangement with the requesting country whereby the country has to observe certain 
"performance criteria." Such criteria usually covers government expenditures, policy on 
trade and payments, as well as payment of foreign debts. 19 
3) Extended IMF Facility - A member with a deficit in its balance of payments can 
obtain funds larger than the quota in the credit tranches would allow. The member may 
maintain this program for up to three years. Initially, and at every twelve month interval, 
the member should provide a current statement of key policy measures that it is under-
taking to meet the objectives of the program. Purchases in this facility are normally 
made pursuant to that of the first (lower) credit tranche and can only be extended for 
three years.20 
4) Compensatory Financing Facility - Members can draw on the IMF to compensate 
for shortfalls in their export revenues when, due to an unpredictable event beyond the 
member's direct control, there is a sudden drop in the member's export-commodity 
revenues.21 
5) Enlarged Access Policy - Under this facility, members with serious balance of 
payments difficulty can obtain supplementary financing when they are in the upper 
credit tranches or beyond.22 This facility is subject to conditionality and performance 
criteria and these standby arrangements last somewhere between one to three years.25 
The modus operandi of the IMF is as follows: upon a country's request for use of 
resources in the credit tranches, a team of IMF economists visits the country to determine 
14 L.A. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 24. Special Drawing Rights are credits that a country has in its 
account with the IMF and can use them to buy hard currency from the IMF in order to payoff 
foreign debts. 
15 IMF SURVEY, Sept. 1984, at 8. For the purposes of this article, when IMF standby arrange-
ments, stabilization policies, austerity programs, conditionality and funding is discussed, the refer-
ence will be to the credit tranches unless otherwise specified. 
16Id. 
17Id. 
IBId. 
19Id. 
2°Id. 
21 /d. Allende used the Compensatory Financing Facility of the IMF on two separate occasions 
when the world market price of copper dropped unexpectedly. 
22Id. 
25/d. 
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and analyze the extent of the "economic malaise."24 After meeting with the governor of 
the central banks and the finance minister in the requesting country, the IMF recom-
mends a specific fiscal policy in order to approve further funding for the country. This 
"seal of approval" by the IMF indicates to other investors that the country is "safe" for 
capital investment.25 After negotiations, a "letter of intent" is sent by the requesting 
country to the IMF which states its commitment to the new economic policies and its 
willingness to undergo an "austerity program" to "cure" inflation and the balance of 
payments problem. This austerity program aims at increasing the flow of foreign ex-
change into the country and minimizing its use in the public sector. 26 The program 
usually requires the liberalization of foreign exchange and import controls, the deval-
uation of the exchange rate, the implementation of domestic anti-inflationary measures, 
and higher interest rates in domestic banks. This deficit is controlled by abolishing price 
controls and consumer subsidies in food, health and medical care, housing, heating oil, 
and a variety of services in order to create an environment which would be conducive 
for foreign investment. 27 These measures cause the purchasing power of the lower classes 
to decrease substantially, since incomes are subject to wage ceilings despite the removal 
of price control on basic human needs. Thus, without any government subsidies in the 
public sector, the disadvantaged sectors of society are less able to afford essential foods 
and medicine which leads to a higher rate of infant mortality, malnutrition, and disease 
in the recipient country.28 Under such circumstances, a pro-labor government could 
assist the victims of the economic policy by adjusting their wages to the inflation rate as 
well as rationing and imposing price control on basic human needs, whereas a govern-
ment which represents business interests would intransigently comply with the IMF 
policies despite the socio-economic indicators of rising poverty and unemployment. 
There are a number of reasons why the IMF is capable of exercising such leverage. 
Generally, international commercial banks and financing institutions will not act positively 
on requests for credits or loans, unless the requesting country has received the IMF "seal 
of approval."29 By being an intergovernmental organization with an established credi-
bility, the IMF is capable of imposing conditions to enforce the financial stability of 
foreign investments. Despite the fact that countries with balance of payment difficulties 
are reluctant to contact the IMF because of the harsh conditionality, they ultimately need 
to do so in order to continue their business transactions with banks and to import foreign 
capital for the resumption of trade.30 By the time a country submits a request for the 
higher credit tranches, however, it is usually under acute economic strains and subject 
to the IMF's severe conditionality. Thus the recepient country has to compromise on its 
domestic socio-economic development projects and focus the country's economic goals 
and policy on overcoming external deficit. 31 
24 C. PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD 
32 (1974). 
25 [d. 
26 [d. 
27 Letelier, The Chicago Boys in Chile, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 12, 1976, at 666. 
28 [d. 
29 CAPITALISM AND THE STATE IN U.S. LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 184 (R. Fagen ed., 1979). 
so THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 169-81 (N. Girvan ed., 
1973). 
SI [d. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Ever since its inception in 1945, the United Nations has elaborated on the importance 
of the protection of human rights and has drafted covenants, declarations and treaties 
to that effect. The initial promulgation of such principles was manifested in the Charter 
of the United Nations (hereinafter cited as the "Charter") which was declared on June 
26, 1945.32 The Charter was drafted and universally applauded at a time when the 
decolonization and independance movements in the Third World had not yet taken 
place. Article 55 of the Charter states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
the United Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related prob-
lems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.33 
Articles 56 and 57 of the Charter explicitly state that all member nations and all 
United Nations specialized agencies will act within this framework to enhance these 
goals.34 The International Monetary Fund is an independant specialized agency of the 
United Nations.35 The agreement between the United Nations and the IMF strives to 
'2 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. "The Purposes of the United Nations are: ... 3. To achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all." Furthermore, art. 55 states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems, and international cultural and educational cooperation, and; c. 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction to race, sex, language or religion. 
"U.N'. CHARTER art. 55. 
34 U.N. CHARTER art. 56 provides that: "[alII Members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth 
in Article 55." Furthermore, Article 57 provides that: 
1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and 
having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in 
economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into 
relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63. 
2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter 
referred to as specialized agencies. 
"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (came 
into effect in 1947), art. I, para. 2 states that: "The Fund is a specialized agency established by 
agreement among its member governments and having wide international responsibilities, as de-
fined in its Articles of Agreement, in economic and related fields within the meaning of Article 57 
of the Charter of the United Nations." 
1986] MONETARY FUND IN CHILE 149 
coordinate the policies of the IMF with those of the United Nations by having reciprocal 
representation and an exchange of information between the two organizations.56 In 
addition, under Article 63 of the United Nations Charter, the Economic and Social 
Council has the duty of extending the relationship between the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies. 57 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter cited as the "Declaration"), 
adopted unanimously by the United Nations on November 10, 1948, addresses all the 
rights and freedoms to which people are entitled.58 The Declaration calls for the universal 
recognition of rights including the right to food, housing, health care, clothing, work, 
social security, and the freedom to opinion, association and expression.59 Article 25 of 
the Universal Declaration states: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control .... 40 
The most significant impact of the Declaration is that it indicates the universal 
consensus by nations of the rights which are fundamental for human beings. The 
International Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in 1968 concluded: 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights states a common under-
standing of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable 
rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for 
the members of the international community.4) 
This proclamation made by all member states of the U. N. manifests that the Declaration 
was regarded as a blueprint of the obligations and responsibilities of the member coun-
tries to their people. 
In 1960, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendance to Colonial Countries and Peoples in which it stated foreign domination of 
any country to be a violation of fundamental human rights and contrary to the principles 
of the Charter.42 The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples requests all states to respect the principles of noninterference.45 
56 [d. at arts. II, IV, V. 
57 U.N. CHARTER art. 63 states that: 
1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the 
agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned 
shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be 
subject to approval by the General Assembly. 2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the 
specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to the General 
Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations. 
sSG.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. Al81O, at 71 (1948). 
59 [d. at arts. 19, 22, 23, 25. 
40 [d. at art. 25. 
41 U.N. Doc. AlCon£. at 32/41; U.N. Publi. E. 68.XIV.2 (1968). 
42 U.N.G.A., Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960. 
45 [d. at art. 7. This article provides that: 
... all States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Decla-
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Finally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were drafted by the United 
Nations in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.44 These intrinsically interlinked sets of 
rights were presented in separate covenants for several reasons.4S It was argued that 
different implementation systems were needed for each set of rights: political rights 
violations required an immediate remedy, whereas violations of economic rights required 
a transformation of the economic infrastructure in society. In addition, each set of rights 
is more politically conducive to the socialist or capitalist member states: whereas the 
socialist countries were more willing to endorse and promulgate economic rights, the 
capitalist countries were the ardent supporters of civil and political rights.46 Therefore, 
the separate drafting of the covenants was not only designed as a compromise, but also 
as a means of ensuring sufficient support for each covenant in order to maintain its 
survival in an effective form. 
The state parties signing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights recognized economic rights including the right to food, shelter, health care, 
clothing, and social security and committed themselves to undertake measures to ensure 
the realization of such rights.47 These rights have been referred to as "aspirations" rather 
than human rights in most capitalist nations, particularly the United States.4S In 1982, 
Eliot Abrams, President Ronald Reagan's Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, opposed the ratification of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights by the United States on the grounds that many 
developing countries were not yet ready for these rights and that they would be pro-
gressively adopted "along the road to development."49 Ironically, four decades earlier, 
United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the crucial nature of economic 
rights and proclaimed the necessity for the United States to endorse them in their 
entirety: 
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual 
freedom cannot exist without economic security and independance. We have 
accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of 
security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, 
or creed. 
Among these are: 
The right to a useful and renumerative job ... ; 
ration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, 
and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity. 
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. 
Al6316 (1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 19, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 
16) 49, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ESCR Covenant]. 
45 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 211-12 (T. Meron ed., 
1984). 
461d. 
47 ESCR Covenant, supra note 44, arts. 9, 11, 12. See also Manouchehr Ganji, The Realization 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Problems, Policies, Progress. U.N. Doc. ElCN.4/1108/Rev.l 
(1975). 
48 Reagan Aide Opposes V.N. Covenant on Social and Economic Rights, International Herald Tribune, 
Feb. II, 1982, at 3, col. 1. 
491d. 
1986] MONETARY FUND IN CHILE 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and 
recreation; 
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmo-
sphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies 
at home or abroad; 
The right of every family to a decent home; 
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and 
enjoy good health; 
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, 
sickness, accident, and unemployment; 
The right to a good education.50 
IV. ALLENDE'S PRESIDENCY 
151 
Upon his election in September 1970, President Salvador Allende declared his 
economic strategy to be the replacement of the market oriented economy in Chile with 
a central-planning economy. 51 Such a fundamental change would allow the government 
to redistribute income and social benefits to the lower strata in the society. Among the 
priorities of the regime were to diversify exports, nationalize all industries, and allocate 
a major share of the government's budget for the development of the living status of 
the people.52 Private land holdings were largely nationalized and cooperatives were 
formed for the purpose of increasing the public's control on the means of production.53 
Moreover, the socio-economic goals of Allende and the Unidad Popular Party included 
free education and medical care for all persons, housing projects for the poor, liberation 
of the status of women in the society, and the extension of social security benefits to the 
needy. 54 
Health care was a top priority on the government's agenda.55 In January 1971, 
Allende launched an emergency program to provide a daily supply of one-half liter of 
milk for all children under fifteen, as well as for pregnant and nursing mothers. 56 The 
purpose of this program was to supplement necessary nutrients, to educate mothers on 
nutritional needs, and to focus attention on the importance of better health and nutri-
tional care.57 By 1972, nine percent of the country's expenditure in the health sector 
went into the milk distribution program.58 Although this project did not completely 
alleviate caloric deficiencies in children in Chile, nevertheless it succeeded in reaching 
seventy percent of the target group, mostly in the "unprivileged" sector of society. 59 
50 Franklin D. Roosevelt (1944) quoted in J.F. GREEN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
14-15 (1956). 
51 INFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 68-69 (R. Thorp & L. Whitehead eds., 
1979). 
52 B. STALLINGS, CLASS CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE, 1958-1973 126 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as STALLINGS]. See also CHILE AND ALLENDE 50 (L. Sobel ed., 1974). 
53 Sobel, supra note 52, at 50. 
5'Id. 
55 Hakim & Solimano, Supplemental Feeding As A Nutritional Interuention: The Chilean Experience 
in the Distribution of Milk, 22 JOURNAL OF TROPICAL PEDIATRICS 185-202 (1976). 
56Id. 
57Id. 
5Bld. 
50Id. Unfortunately, in many cases, the milk was prepared under unsanitary conditions. 
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Despite the foreign exchange shortage and the economic pressures caused by the with-
drawal of the United States Agency for International Development, the Allende govern-
ment continued to import milk substitutes.6o Not discounting other relevant factors, the 
results of this program indicate some positive improvements: infant mortality dropped 
by eighteen percent, childhood death due to diseases dropped by approximately twenty-
five percent, and malnutrition dropped by twenty percent.61 
Furthermore, during this period, social services, health care, education, welfare, 
and food subsidies were all made preferentially available in the neighborhoods where 
the low-income workers, unemployed, and retired lower class citizens resided.62 A leg-
islation was put into effect which held that the minimum wage for all workers should 
be observed, and wages should be adjusted by 100% to the increasing cost of living.63 
After one year of Allende's presidency, the nationalization of copper from the control 
of the multinational corporations had been achieved by unanimous legislative support.64 
The Gross Domestic Product had risen by 8.5%, unemployment had fallen from 8.3% 
to 3.8%, and inflation had fallen from thirty-three percent to twenty percent.65 
V. THE IMPEDIMENTS: INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND EXTERNAL DURESS 
A coalescence of external and internal factors ultimately led to the downfall of 
Salvador Allende. Domestically, the economy was in a delicately unstable condition. Real 
estate owners, cognizant of the government's nationalization policies and untrusting of 
a Marxist president, were rapidly selling their property.66 The capital flight out of Chile 
had nearly exhausted the foreign exchange reserves.67 In 1972, while the inflation rate 
was the highest in the world at 160%, the government had continued to provide food 
subsidies and wage adjustments for the poor, thus further fueling inflation.68 Moreover, 
while Chile's self-sufficiency in agricultural products had decreased, the demand for 
food had risen due to the redistribution of income. In response, the government im-
ported food, the costs for which rose from 135.5 million dollars in 1970 to 594.9 million 
dollars in 1973.69 As food prices increased 117%, the government used restrictive mea-
sures to ensure that the price of certain commodities used by the lower classes, such as 
chick peas, were increased only by four percent.70 Predictably, a class conflict developed 
between the "protected" poor and the middle class who felt the most economic pressure. 
The government was held responsible for the increasing hardships, which led to the 
mistrust and resentment of governmental policies. 
Concurrently, ideological and political opposition came from all fronts. On the left, 
a split occured in the Unidad Popular Party. The moderates, including Allende, advo-
cated the use of capitalist means of operation until the time came when the socialist 
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means would be properly developed, whereas the radical faction argued that the eco-
nomic difficulties were due to the lack of speed in the transformation of the economy.7l 
In addition to this inter-party conflict, there was intransigent opposition to the Unidad 
Popular Party from conservative groups. The Chilean Congress was dominated by the 
National Party and the Christian Democrats, conservative parties who had supported 
the media campaigns and strikes against the government.72 The industrialists coalesced 
to instigate sabotage against the government. Depleted of options in 1973, Allende 
appointed a large number of influential military officials to his cabinet.7S 
The domestic turmoil was partially due to external pressures. An overview of Chile's 
history indicates that the country was always financially dependant on the United States 
and had a record of receiving the largest per capita aid in the world from the United 
States.74 Balance of payment problems, shortages, inflation, and other domestic economic 
problems had always existed in Chile.75 The only variable in 1970 was that a Marxist 
president, who was intransigently dedicated to expropriating foreign capital, was at the 
helm of the Chilean Government. 
Prior to Allende's election, the United States Central Intelligence Agency had spent 
millions of dollars bribing various political organizations in Chile for their votes against 
Allende, had financially sponsored right-wing propaganda groups, and had mobilized 
anti-Allende groups.76 These activities were planned, organized, and financially spon-
sored by the "Forty Committee" which was comprised of the United States Secretary of 
State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Undersec-
retary of State for Political Affairs, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 77 
Upon Allende's election, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger commented: "I don't 
see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility 
of its own people."78 The "Allende Doctrine" was regarded as a serious threat on United 
States business interests abroad and it was used to justify, to the American people, the 
exertion of harsh economic pressures on Chile.79 Not only were the interests of United 
States private corporations at stake, but according to the Forty Committee, Allende's 
victory in Chile would have created dangerous precedent by providing ideological fuel 
for similar acts of nationalization and expropriation of United States' business interests 
from other Third World nations. so 
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By 1971, the Chilean government had nationalized the holdings of most foreign 
corporations, and having assessed Anaconda and Kennecott corporations as having made 
"excess profits" from the copper industry, the Chilean government refused to pay them 
any compensation.8' In retaliation, President Richard Nixon announced that the United 
States would not only stop all economic aid, but would also "withhold its support from 
loans under consideration in multilateral development banks" until United States citizens 
were adequately compensated.82 Prior to 1971, the United States had played a direct 
and salient role in supporting Chile's economy by importing forty percent of its essential 
commodities and through its voting influence in the loan and credit endowment of the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment.8S Therefore the monumental impact of this reversal in United States policy vis-
a-vis Chile need hardly be emphasized. 
In response to Allende's expropriation of United States business interests in Chile, 
the United States retaliated by voting against economic aid to Chile in financial institu-
tions.84 The economic assistance from the United States Agency for International De-
velopment which had annually averaged 37.7 million dollars was officially cancelled in 
1970.85 The Eximbank terminated its credit-giving to Chile, although in the past twenty-
five years, six hundred million dollars worth of credit had been given.86 The United 
States Commerce Department admitted that Chile's credit worthiness was not the reason 
for the denial. 87 The effect was disastrous on the Chilean economy because of the 
dependance on Eximbank's credit. This credit had provided informal insurance on 
commercial transactions in Chile, and its withdrawal influenced banks to deny loans and 
to withdraw their assets from Chile.88 In 1972, Chile was capable only of obtaining thirty 
million dollars in short term private credits from commercial banks, as opposed to the 
previous annual figure of three hundred million dollars.89 
Furthermore, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation would no longer provide 
any investment guarantees for corporations interested in investing in Chile.90 The Inter-
American Development Bank, which had provided more than 310 million dollars worth 
of loans to Chile since 1961, denied all but two small loans which were specifically 
directed to opposition controlled private universities.9l The World Bank, which had lent 
235 million dollars to that country since its inception, denied all loan requests to Chile 
between 1970 and 1973.92 This action on the part of the World Bank seems to violate 
provisions of the Charter which call upon international cooperation to enhance the living 
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conditions of people.9s It is against World Bank policy to deny loans on ideological 
grounds. At the 1972 World BanklIMF Annual Meeting, the Chilean Central Bank 
President, Inostroza, commented that the World Bank was guilty of acting in a "preju-
diced manner" and being "an instrument of private interests of one of its member 
countries. "94 
In this period, Chile made a drawing from the Compensatory Financing Facility of 
the IMF in order to offset the sudden drop in copper prices. However, the government 
was reluctant to concede to any standby arrangements since they would have undermined 
the country's economic policies.95 In addition, Allende had committed his government 
to the repayment of the three billion dollars worth of foreign debt which he had inherited 
from the previous government, and this debt exacerbated the pressures on the econ-
omy.96 Thus by exerting its financial muscle to exclude Chile from all bilateral and 
multilateral aid on which it was dependent, the Nixon Administration succeeded in 
creating a situation of severe crisis in the domestic economy, which was further exacer-
bated by opposition coalitions. 
VI. THE POLITICo-ECONOMY OF AN AUTHORITARIAN FREE-MARKET REGIME 
On September 11, 1973, General Augusta Pinochet terminated Salvador Allende's 
presidency via a coup d'etat. He immediately imposed a temporary state of siege which 
lasted for five years, followed by a "state of emergency" and a "state of exception" which 
are still in effect.97 The regime justified these states of action by arguing the tangible 
possibility of takeover by communists and thus attempted to legitimize its violations of 
the most fundamental freedoms of Chilean citizens.98 
Upon the seizure of power, the military government pursued a laissez faire economic 
policy. Young Chilean economists, who had been financed by the United States Agency 
for International Development to study under Milton Friedman in the University of 
Chicago, returned to their country for this opportunity to implement the free-market 
policies in a tightly monitored system.99 At the same time the government requested the 
IMF and the World Bank to "rescue" the economy. The IMF approved a standby loan 
on the condition that strict monetary policies would be maintained and that the austerity 
measures would be enforced by the government. lOO 
In response to the strict requirements of the austerity program, the Chilean Junta 
reversed many of the central policies of the Unidad Popular Regime by the imposition 
of wage ceilings, the reduction of public sector employment and expenditure, the abo-
lition of import controls and price controls for basic needs, and the increase of military 
spending. lol The working class, Pinochet's staunchest opposition, was denied any partic-
9S U.N. CHARTER art. 1. 
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ipation in economic decision-making. 102 Furthermore, strikes and collective bargaining 
were declared illegal. 103 In other economic developments, the Junta devalued the cur-
rency 143%, allowed the price of essential commodities to increase between 200% and 
1800%, terminated land reform, and, despite a trade deficit of 500 million dollars and 
a foreign debt of 4 billion dollars, returned previously privately owned property and 
nationalized companies to their original owners.104 Simultaneously, the Pinochet govern-
ment made serious political moves. The Junta banned the Marxist Party, removed all 
past mayors and congressmen from their offices, abolished the pro-Allende Central 
Labor Federation, and arrested and began the execution of dissenting individuals. 105 
In May 1975, The Economist declared the "Chicago Model" a failure. I06 Inflation and 
food prices had risen beyond control in the two years of military rule and ten percent 
of "registered workers" were jobless. The prediction was that " ... things are going to 
get worse since 1974 was the year that copper prices peaked."107 Both the IMF and the 
official Junta data indicate that at the end of 1975, unemployment in the Santiago region 
was 18.7% and more than twenty-two percent in the countryside. lOB Again according to 
conservative estimates, one-forth of the population, 2.5 million Chileans, had no income 
at all and were able to live solely because of the aid provided by Church and humanitarian 
groups. 109 The price of a minimum food basket was approximately three times the 
monthly wages of minimum-wage workers.lIo A white collar worker was estimated to 
spend eighty-seven percent of his income on food, yet the caloric intake was below that 
recommended by the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization of the United Nations.11I Infant mortality jumped eighteen percent during the 
first year of Pinochet's rule and malnutrition in children in Santiago went over sixty-one 
percent. I 12 
A United Nations report issued in 1977 stated that the Chilean government's policies 
imposed economic and social hardships on the most vulnerable strata in the popula-
tion. ll3 Although the Junta declared health to be a basic human right in the Constitutional 
Act, the government did not provide public health care. 1I4 Health care was not only 
made private, but there was a budget cut in the services available, community health 
workers were jailed and disbanded, and programs such as the milk distribution program 
were immediately terminated. Il5 According to the president of the Colegio Medico de 
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Chile, Dr. E. Medina, hospitals continued to function despite the short supply of essential 
items such as antibiotics. ll6 
It is now more than twelve years since the coup and Chileans are still living in a 
state of repression. The banks and industries are being run by a few private financial 
groups, the army has grown from 50,000 men in 1973 to 200,000, and the income 
distribution remains inequitable. ll7 The "Chicago Model" of a trickle down economic 
policy has had disastrous consequences in Chile. Originally, it was supported by multi-
lateral development banks, multinational corporations, United States commercial banks, 
and the IMF.l1B Maldistribution of income and benefits is at the core of this model, since 
a free-market policy with no government interference dictates that only the upper 
echelons of society can afford to pay for and benefit from the exorbitant prices allocated 
to the limited supply of essential commodities. 119 
The IMF's austerity program in conjunction with the "Chicago 'free-market' Model" 
could only be imposed and maintained in Chile because the authoritarian regime had 
created an artificially "aquiescent" environment for the enforcement of these policies. 120 
In the Chilean case, the symbiotic nexus between the free-market economic system and 
the authoritarian political system is evident. In order to implement the stringent eco-
nomic policies, the Junta provided the repression that was allegedly necessary to stifle 
any democratic objections and dissent to the pressures caused by the IMF's austerity 
program. Thus the IMF had a direct and powerful impact in directing the politico-
economic policies and was an influential actor in the undermining of legally required 
respect for human rights in Chile. 
VII. UNITED STATES INFLUENCE IN SUPPORTING THE PINOCHET RULE 
In principle, the United States is an advocate of democratic processes, yet the Chilean 
case study indicates that, in practice, American economic and political interests abroad 
have determined the extent to which human rights and democratic values are promul-
gated in developing countries. Various United States administrations have supported 
Pinochet in the past twelve years, despite the fact that state terror has been institution-
alized and legitimized. The support of the United States government for Pinochet tests 
the actual commitment of the United States to promoting democracy in the Third World. 
United States influence was used to withhold economic aid from Chile between 1970 
and 1973 which ultimately led to an explosive domestic situation. Pursuant to the 1973 
coup, United States economic aid was used to support Chile with loans and credit to 
maintain and stabilize the repressive military government. 
Although the Chilean economy was at its historic worst in 1974, it received a total 
of 110.9 million dollars from the multilateral development banks in the first few months 
of that year. 121 Under the standby arrangements, the IMF loaned 136.2 million dollars 
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to Chile in 1974, 266.4 in 1975, and 140.6 in 1976. 122 During this period, the World 
Bank loaned an annual average of 22 million dollars to Chile. 123 At this time, the 
Scandinavian member nations abstained from supporting loans to Chile, but due to their 
limited voting power, could not put a stop to the loans.124 
In September 1973, a week prior to the coup, when a significant bread shortage 
was visible, the United States refused Chile's request for 300,000 tons of wheat. Yet, a 
week after the coup, the United States government extended, on credit, 24.5 million 
dollars worth of wheat to the Junta. 125 In the words of United States Senator Edward 
Kennedy, this credit alone amounted to "eight times the total commodity credit offered 
to Chile in the last three years when a democratically elected government was in 
power."126 
Under PL 480 Title I, the United States government gave the Chilean government 
57.8 million dollars in loans in 1975, whereas the rest of Latin America received only 
nine million dollars.127 According to Dr. Giorgio Solimano, former Director of the 
Department of Nutrition in Chile, the food which the Junta received under PL 480 was 
sold to the local merchants who in turn sold it to the highest bidders in the market. 128 
Thus the food did not reach those in critical need of it. When restrictive legislation was 
adopted to specifically limit aid from governmental agencies to Chile, the Eximbank 
compensated for the decrease by increasing its loan to that country.129 
Meanwhile, the United States Congress has not been reticent on the United States' 
role in Chile. Through legislation, Congress terminated military aid to Chile in 1976 
and put a ceiling on bilateral economic aid. 130 The Harkin Amendment called on United 
States representatives in the multilateral development banks to vote against loans to 
"gross violators of human rights" unless the "loan proceeds would directly benefit needy 
people."131 This amendment was signed into law by President Ford in 1976. However, 
the lack of any criteria for determining "needy people" has provided the administration 
with a loophole. 132 
In 1978, Representative Tom Harkin introduced his legislative amendment regard-
ing the policies of the IMF and their impact on human rights. 133 In its first provision, 
the amendment called upon the United States representative in the IMF to only en-
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courage stabilization programs which enhance employment and are consistent with basic 
needs"~4 The second provision required the Executive Branch to oppose all IMF trans-
actions that violated basic human rights or needs and to integrate such a foundation 
permanently within the IMF.135 Finally, the third provision of the amendment called for 
a study of the effect of IMF transactions on the poor.I~6 
The Harkin Amendment passed the House by a strong majority (267-125), although 
in the Senate it was amended to the point of losing all of its human rights language. 137 
The second provision was entirely deleted and the third provision was qualified. us 
Secretary of Treasury Blumenthal stressed the "apolitical" nature of the IMF as incon-
sistent with the Amendment, while Senators Javits and Church reiterated the necessity 
of a sector of society to be deprived of its basic needs in order to attain economic 
prosperity.I~9 Senator Javits stated that the citizens of Third World countries "should be 
proud of their willingness to sacrifice" their food, shelter, and health care in order that 
they can "put themselves in some kind of a viable economic condition."14o 
The IMF has maintained that it cannot take political factors into consideration since 
it retains the support of its members by being an "apolitical" entity. Yet, no financial 
institution which promotes a specific economic policy and only provides assistance to 
countries that concede ,to restructuring their economies such that they will follow the 
free-market/trickle down approach can be apolitical. The International Monetary Fund 
is a political actor insofar as it shapes countries' economies, determines the flow of 
foreign capital, dictates the role of the government in the public sector and thereby 
influences the living conditions of the people. In the words of United States Represen-
tative Tom Harkin: 
... when the IMF says that they deal only in money and not in politics, I 
would suggest that there is nothing in this world more political than money, 
how it is loaned, and under what conditions it is loaned. 141 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Chilean case-study manifests the ability of the United States government to 
influence Third World economies through its voting power in the International Mone-
tary Fund. The IMF, in particular, is in a sensitive position. On the one hand, as the 
"doorman" of foreign investment, loans, and credit, its endorsement of economic policies 
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is crucial to the economic reconstruction of most debt-ridden Third World economies. 
On the other hand, by virtue of the free-trade principles from which it stems, its Articles 
of Agreement, and its inflexibility in considering and amending the socio-political re-
percussions of its policies, it is unlikely that the IMF as it is currently structured and 
functions can positively contribute to the development of Third World countries. 
The constant threat and possibility of the IMF as a forum where the United States 
can exercise its foreign policy objectives via exertion of economic pressures needs to be 
considered in the overall evaluation of the organization. It is imperative to maintain that 
the IMF, despite its claims, is not an "apolitical" financial institution. This is not only 
due to the evident power structure within the organization itself, but basically due to 
the fact that the IMF as a specialized agency of the United Nations is legally bound to 
function consistently with the principles and goals of the United Nations, as stated in 
the Charter. Respect for the principle of self-determination and the promotion of human 
rights are at the very core of the goals of the United Nations. It is necessary for the IMF 
to amend its policies such that it will integrate the flexibility needed within the packaging 
of its austerity programs to respond to the impact of its policies on the realization of 
human rights. 
As the most influential government in the International Monetary Fund, the United 
States can take the initiative necessary to bring about reforms which would ensure that 
the IMF acts according to the principles of the United Nations. The reversal of the 
United States' adament support for the Pinochet government was recently indicated 
when the United States submitted a draft resolution to the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission, asserting and condemning the human rights violations in Chile. 142 
The United States could compliment this act and manifest the seriousness of its recent 
commitment to non-support for authoritarianism by integrating human rights factors 
into the policy framework of the IMF. Such a rudimentary transition will ensure the 
realization of human rights and socio-economic development. 
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